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Jim Hightower, On The Air radio
commentary
STEALING OUR VOTES
10/8/2003 We're told that the beauty of America's political system is that we the people have the right to vote. Yes . . ., but do we have the right to have our votes properly counted? In the old days, corrupt political
bosses would sometimes stuff the ballot box, or even steal the box. In
today's modern, computerized age, however, such thievery can be done by
sophisticated software manipulation without anyone even touching the
ballot boxes. Indeed most states no longer have ballot boxes at all,
having replaced them with touch-screen technology that (they promise!)
digitally records our votes in cyberspace.
Swell . . . except, how do we know
that our digital votes on these computers actually are recorded in real
space? There's growing evidence that not only can these machines be
manipulated by hackers or unscrupulous sellers of these machines, but
that such corruption of our votes already is taking place. In Georgia,
for example, 22,000 touch-screen machines had to get emergency fixes in
2002 because a "rob-georgia" software bug was found on the seller's
site.
The computer providers, however,
refuse to let election officials examine their computer codes, claiming
that the codes are proprietary trade secrets. "Trust us," they say.
"No," I say. One reason we shouldn't trust them is that the two largest
sellers of the machines also happen to be major campaign donors to
George Bush's Republican party. In Ohio, for example, the CEO of
Diebold , a major seller, sent out a fund-raising letter asking for
$10,000-donations to Bush's re-election bid – just one day prior to
getting his touch-screen computers approved for use in Ohio.
To stop electronic vote theft, support
H.R. 2239, requiring a paper audit of all electronic votes. For info
call the office of Representative Rush Holt: 202-225-5801.
"Dare Accepted on Electronic Voting Machines," The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 08/20/03 "Democrats Want Election Machine Firm Thrown Out," Port Clinton News Herald, 08/27/03 The Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act (H.R. 2239), www.house.gov/holt |
PETITION To: US Congress We request that all members of Congress support the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003, introduced by Rep Rush Holt. The assurance that votes be counted is a mandatory part of voter rights, according to the provisions of the US Constitution, Articles 1 & 2, and The Voting Rights Act, and Supreme Court decisions; Allen v. Board of Elections (1969), Reynolds v Sims (1964), and Wesberry v. Sanders (1964) Section 8 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.Code § 1973f states that the voting officials must make sure " . . . whether persons who are entitled to vote are being permitted to vote . . . (and) whether votes cast by persons entitled to vote are being properly tabulated . . ." Many electronic voting systems being
introduced do not comply with these legal and logical requirements.
This must be addressed immediately. There must be accountablity and
assurance that the votes that are cast are recorded correctly. “We cannot afford nor can we permit another major assault on the integrity of the American electoral process,” said Rep. Rush Holt. “Imagine it’s Election Day 2004. You enter your local polling place and go to cast your vote on a brand new “touch screen” voting machine. The screen says your vote has been counted. As you exit the voting booth, however, you begin to wonder. How do I know if the machine actually recorded my vote? The fact is, you don’t.” Last October, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), groundbreaking election reform legislation that is currently helping states throughout the country replace antiquated and unreliable punch card and butterfly ballot voting systems. HAVA, however, is having an unintended consequence. It is fueling a rush by states and localities to purchase computer-voting systems that suffer from a serious flaw; voters and election officials have no way of knowing whether the computers are counting votes properly. Hundreds of nationally renowned computer scientists, including internationally renowned expert David Dill of Stanford University, consider a voter-verified paper trial to be a critical safeguard for the accuracy, integrity and security of computer-assisted elections. “Voting should not be an act of blind faith. It should be an act of record,” said Rep Rush Holt. “But current law does nothing to protect the integrity of our elections against computer malfunction, computer hackers, or any other potential irregularities.” There have already been several examples of computer error in elections. In the 2002 election, brand new computer voting systems used in Florida lost over 100,000 votes due to a software error. Errors and irregularities were also reported in New Jersey, Missouri, Georgia, Texas, and at least 10 other states. “A recount requires that there be a
reliable record to check,” said Holt. “Without an actual paper record
that each voter can confidentially inspect, faulty or hacked computer
systems will simply spit out the same faulty or hacked result. Every
vote in every election matters. We can and should do this in time for
the 2004 federal election.” Sincerely, |
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San Francisco - The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) today applauded a technical working group for heeding critics who called for rejection of a flawed electronic voting standard proposal that failed to require adequate security measures. The working group of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) drafted the electronic voting standard in an environment plagued by a lack of consensus, procedural misconduct, and serious security oversights. EFF last week called on IEEE members and other citizens to voice their concerns about the standard. Nearly five hundred people wrote to IEEE leadership pointing out flaws in the draft standard. On September 22, the first working group ballot on the draft failed overwhelmingly, causing the simultaneous ballot at the sponsor level to fail as well. "Defeat of the initial flawed IEEE electronic voting standard is a victory for IEEE's democratic process," said EFF Legal Director Cindy Cohn. "We are glad that the majority of the IEEE working group recognizes the serious problems with this current electronic voting standard proposal and hope that the working group will now fix the standard to reflect current security norms." Critics pointed out that one of the most glaring problems with the draft was its failure to require, or even recommend a mechanism to allow a true manual recount or auditing of votes. Some voting machine companies already offer one such mechanism, known as a voter-verifiable paper audit trail. These machines produce a paper ballot for each voter and allow voters to see a summary of their votes to confirm that election officials are recording their votes accurately. Florida's Broward County - one site of the infamous hanging, dimpled, and pregnant chads - announced on September 24, 2003, that it will consider adding the audit capability to its new $17 million dollar voting system due to concerns about potentially undetectable election fraud. "The American public deserves voting technology that we can trust," said EFF Activist Ren Bucholz. "Today, that means requiring a voter-verifiable paper audit trail, or its equivalent, in all electronic voting systems." This week, the Science Application International Corporation (SAIC) released a report that confirmed earlier concerns about Maryland's Diebold voting system. Maryland officials hired the private security firm in response to a July 2003 report critical of the Diebold system by researchers at Johns Hopkins University and Rice University. The SAIC report generally reinforced and expanded upon the security flaws discovered by the university researchers, concluding that the Diebold voting system was "at a high risk of compromise." The IEEE standard will now go back to its drafting committee, Project 1583, which holds its next meeting in Austin, Texas, in October. Once finalized, the U.S. and other governments worldwide will likely adopt the IEEE electronic voting standard, since IEEE sits on a technical advisory board established by the federal Help America Vote Act (HAVA). EFF has renewed its call for interested scientists to participate in the IEEE processes.
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How Did Diebold
Machines Register NEGATIVE 16,022 Votes
for Al Gore in Volusia, FL??? Mark Crispin Miller writes,
"A remarkable exchange concerning Diebold's voting machines in Volusia
County, Florida. On January 17, 2001, Lana Hines, a county elections
official sends out an inquiry as to how Al Gore ended up with a
vote-count of -16,022. That's NEGATIVE 16,022-which just happens also
to have been the total number of votes cast for various independent and
third-party candidates who also ran. markcrispinmiller.blogspot.com
On January 17, 2001, Lana Hines, a county elections official, posted a message to the Diebold programmers wondering how that could be. Diebold has a lot of
explaining to do. Stay tuned. background
info - High-tech voting machines could be rigged, experts say.
Computer security experts warn that hackers could cripple democracy
itself. The controversy flared in
July when a report from Johns Hopkins University's Information Security
Institute found significant security flaws in Diebold software for
touch-screen machines. http://www.prisonplanet.com/archive_vote_fraud.html
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Democrats File Lawsuit To Get 2004 Election Records Anchorage - The Alaska Democratic Party filed suit in Superior Court today seeking to force the Division of Elections to release public records needed to verify the 2004 election results. "We are asking the court to release these public records so that the people of Alaska can be assured that their votes were counted correctly," said Alaska Democratic Party Chair Jake Metcalfe. "The Division of Elections' numbers do not add up. The Division has refused to release the public records that would allow us to verify the results. All we ask is that the Lt. Governor and the Director of Elections follow the law and meet their obligation to Alaskans so every one knows why these numbers don't add up." The Alaska Democratic Party has been trying since last year to get the public records of the election in order to find out why there are numerous errors and discrepancies in the state’s reported results of the 2004 general election. The Division of Elections’ latest excuse for refusing to release the election information is that it would create “security risks." "Nothing we have asked for compromises security," Metcalfe said. ""Why is the Division of Elections is so reluctant to provide these public records? What are they trying to hide?" According to the Division of Elections' vote reports that were produced by the state's Diebold computer system and are posted on the Division's official web site, a far larger number of votes were cast than the official totals reported in the statewide summary. In the case of President George Bush’s votes, the district-by-district totals add up to 292,267, but his official total was only 190,889, a difference of 101,378 votes. In the U.S. Senate race, Lisa Murkowski received 226,992 votes in the district-by-district totals, but her official total was only 149,446, a difference of 77,546 votes. In 20 of the 40 State House Districts, more ballots were cast than there are registered voters in the district, according to information on the state's web site. In 16 election districts, the voter turnout percentage shown is over 200%. "Alaskans must have an accurate accounting of the 2004 election results. "The accountability of our election system is at stake. Confidence in the integrity of our elections is fundamental to our democracy," Metcalfe said. The ADP filed a formal public records request on Dec. 19, 2005, seeking the "central tabulator data file" taken from the Diebold-supplied computer used to run the "GEMS" (Global Election Management Software) application. This is the electronic file containing all final vote tallies for the 2004 General Election. Under the public records regulations, the Division was supposed to release the data file on Jan. 4. On Jan. 4 the Division extended the deadline until Jan. 19. In a Jan. 19 letter, the Division asserted that the file was proprietary information belonging to its contractor, Diebold Elections Systems. In a Feb. 3 letter, the Division advised the Democrats that Diebold had agreed to waive its proprietary rights to the GEMS database files, and said that the records would be provided if it determined that the integrity of the election system could be protected. In the Feb. 3 letter the Division asked for an additional 10-day extension until Feb. 13, and the Democrats agreed. On Feb. 13, the Division again extended the deadline to Feb. 27. In a letter dated Feb. 22, the Division denied the Democrats' public records request, citing "security risks." ### http://www.bradblog.com/archives/00002707.htm
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